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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellis argued that the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied his motion for a continuance of the probation violation 
proceedings so he could retain private counsel. Mr. Ellis also argued that the district 
court violated his due process rights to notice, to prepare a defense, and to call 
witnesses on his behalf, when the district court denied his defense attorney's motion for 
a continuance of the disposition portion of the probation revocation proceedings. In 
response, the State argues that Mr. Ellis' motion for a continuance in order to retain 
private counsel was merely a ruse to delay the probation revocation proceedings. The 
State also argues that, in order to satisfy Mr. Ellis' right to due process, he need only be 
provided notice as to the nature of the alleged probation violations. This brief is 
necessary to clarify, that Mr. Ellis' motion for a continuance to be represented by 
counsel of his choice was not a delay tactic. This brief is also necessary to clarify that 
due process mandates meaningful notice, which includes notice of the date of the 
probation violation hearings and notice of the issues which will be addressed at those 
hearings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Ellis' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Ellis' motion for 
continuance in order to retain private counsel? 
2. Did the district court deny Mr. Ellis due process when it refused to continue the 
disposition portion of the probation revocation hearing, which was requested in 
order for Mr. Ellis to prepare a defense and call witnesses to testify on his 
behalf? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Ellis' Motion For A 
Continuance In Order To Retain Private Counsel 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellis argued that the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied his motion for a continuance to allow private counsel to 
represent him in this matter. In response, the State argues that the timing of Mr. Ellis' 
motion for the continuance provides support for the district court's ruling that the motion 
was merely an attempt to delay the proceedings. Mr. Ellis argues that his motion for a 
continuance was made in good faith, as he initiated the process of retaining private 
counsel prior to the probation revocation hearing. 
At the outset of Mr. Ellis' final probation violation hearing, his public defender 
moved the district court for a continuance in order to get an updated mental health 
evaluation, which was denied after the district court found that Mr. Ellis' asserted need 
for this evaluation was not credible. (03/21/13 Tr., p.3, L.12 - p.7, L.10.) After that 
motion was denied, Mr. Ellis said he was "not ready to proceed" and moved for a 
continuance in order to have private counsel represent him. (03/21/13 Tr., p.7, Ls.11-
24.) Mr. Ellis also informed the district court that he had already spoken with a private 
attorney, John Redal, and Mr. Redal could appear for Mr. Ellis on April 8, 2013, which 
was approximately eighteen days later. (03/21/13 Tr., p.7, Ls.15-19.) Mr. Ellis' second 
motion for a continuance was also denied by the district court, which was based on the 
district court's finding that Mr. Ellis' motion a continuance in order to be represented by 
counsel of his choice was not made in good faith and was merely a delay tactic. 
(03/21/13 Tr., p.7, Ls.20-24.) 
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The State first argues that Mr. Ellis' was undermined because he never 
complained about his mental health medications prior to the March 21, 2013, probation 
revocation hearing. 1 (Respondent's Brief, pp. 7-8.) Specifically, the State relies on the 
district court's finding that since May 17, 2012, "there has never been one time where 
there's been a complaint of not feeling appropriate from a mental health standpoint." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.8 (quoting 03/21/13 Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.6, L.2).) Contrary to the 
State's position, Mr. Ellis addressed issues he had with his medication regime before 
and after he was placed on probation. For example, at the May 17, 2012, hearing, 
Mr. Ellis spoke with the district court about the Department of Correction's decision to 
take him off his Strattera prescription when his treating doctor, Dr. Rhodes, was 
planning on increasing his dosage of Stratterra. (05/17/12 Tr., p.24, L.6 - p.25, L.12.) 
This is consistent with the district court's handwritten note on the December 16, 2012, 
order retaining jurisdiction, which referenced a facsimile it received from Dr. Rhodes. 
(R., pp.454, 457.) At the July 19, 2012, mental health court hearing, Mr. Ellis told the 
district court that he was "not getting meds at jail" and his prescription was "outdated." 
(R., p.472.) The minutes of the December 13, 2012, mental health court hearing also 
indicated that Mr. Ellis was not taking his medications while in county jail. (R., pp.490, 
513.) As such, Mr. Ellis' claim that he was having problems with his medications after 
he was placed on probation on May 17, 2012, is supported by the record. 
1 Mr. Ellis did not raise the denial of his motion for a continuance for an updated mental 
health evaluation in his Appellant's Brief. However, this clarification is being made 
because the State argued that Mr. Ellis' motion for a continuance for an updated mental 
health evaluation was not made on good faith and that lack of good faith undermined his 
credibility as to his subsequent motion for a continuance in order to retain private 
counsel. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-9.) 
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Based on the foregoing, the State then argues that the "timing and 
circumstances" of Mr. Ellis' motion for a continuance in order to retain private counsel 
supports the district court's finding that the motion was merely a delay tactic. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) The State points out the Mr. Ellis only moved for a 
continuance to retain private counsel after the district court denied his prior motion for a 
continuance in order to obtain an updated mental health evaluation. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.7-8.) The order in which Mr. Ellis moved for continuances is of no 
consequence because there would have been no reason to move for a continuance for 
private counsel in the event the district court granted the prior motion for a continuance 
in order to obtain an updated mental health evaluation. Clearly, Mr. Ellis was in the 
process of retaining private counsel before the first motion for a continuance was 
denied, as Mr. Ellis had already spoken with private counsel, John Redal, and Mr. Redal 
told Mr. Ellis that he was available to appear on his behalf on April 8, 2013. (03/21/13 
Tr., p.7, Ls.11-19.) Therefore, the State's argument that Mr. Ellis was attempting to 
delay the proceedings is not supported by the record. 
The State then argues that Mr. Ellis' second motion for a continuance was not 
made in good faith because Mr. Ellis has a history of using private attorneys to delay the 
proceedings. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) In support of this position, the State relies 
on the district court's following ruling: 
[Y]our claim today that you wanted to hire John Redal, who's a fine 
attorney, I find so reprehensible; doesn't have anything to do with my 
decision, but the best attorney you've ever had is seated to your left. Your 
claim that you wanted John Redal today was made nothing -- for no other 
reason than to create delay. That's my specific finding. Somebody has 
paid a lot of money for a variety of different attorneys over the last seven 
years to come into court and delay things for Jerry Ellis. 
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(03/21/13 Tr., p.49, Ls.8-17.) Mr. Ellis responded "It was me, Your Honor." (03/21/13 
Tr., p.49, L.18.) The district court then stated, "That's fine. It's money down the rat 
hole." (03/21 /13 Tr., p.49, Ls.19-20.) 
The State's reliance on this ruling is flawed because it is unconstitutional for a 
district court to punish or otherwise prejudice Mr. Ellis for exercising his right to hire 
private counsel. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982) {"To punish a 
person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process 
violation 'of the most basic sort."') (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 
(1978)); see also Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32-33 n.20 (1973) (holding that 
it is "patently unconstitutional" for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action 
whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights) (quoting Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,631 (1969)). 
The State also argues based on one of the district court's findings, that there was 
a pattern of delay in this matter because it took Mr. Ellis eleven months to enter a guilty 
plea in 2006. (Respondent's Brief pp.8-9 (quoting 03/21/13 Tr., p.48, L.13 - p.49, 
L.17).) There are multiple reasons why the State's reliance on this finding is 
problematic. The first flaw is derived from the district court's own recognition that it was 
not presiding over this case in 2006 and, therefore, the court had little knowledge about 
what actually occurred. (03/21/13 Tr., p.48, Ls.13-18.) Secondly, it does not appear 
that there was much of a hurry to get the proceedings to move quicker because Mr. Ellis 
was already in custody on other charges. (08/25/06 Tr., p.14, L.15 - p.15, L.6; 11/08/06 
Tr., p.20, Ls.4-14.) In fact, Mr. Ellis was in custody for the charges in this matter and for 
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charges in unrelated matters from December 31, 2005, until his sentencing date in this 
matter, November 8, 2006. (11/08/06 Tr., p.20, L.4- p.22, L.16.) 
The State also argues that there was no basis for granting the continuance in 
order for Mr. Ellis to be represented by private counsel because the "record does not 
indicate any 'irreconcilable conflict' between Ellis and his attorney, and neither 
represented to the court that the lines of communication between them had broken 
down." (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) Mr. Ellis recognizes that the existence of an attorney-
client conflict is a relevant factor when reviewing whether a district court should have 
granted a continuance. However, he argues that an absence of a conflict should not be 
afforded much weight in this matter, because the denial of the right to select counsel of 
one's choice constitutes structural error. In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 540 U.S. 
140 (2006), the defendant tried to hire an out-of-state attorney who filed a motion 
seeking admission pro hac vice, which was denied by the trial court. Id. at 142. The 
defendant argued that the trial court denied his Sixth Amendment right to be 
represented by counsel of his choice. Id. at 142-143. 
The United States Supreme Court eventually granted certiorari in order to 
address the limited issue of whether the denial of the right to select counsel of one's 
choice was subject to harmless error review. Id. at 143-144. In resolving that issue, the 
Supreme Court drew a distinction between the right to effective assistance of counsel 
and the right to counsel of one's choice. Id. at 144-148. Specifically, it held: 
[The Sixth Amendment] commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a 
particular guarantee of fairness be provided-to wit, that the accused be 
defended by the counsel he believes to be best. "The Constitution 
guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the 
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the 
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Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause."121 In sum, the right at 
stake here is the right to counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial; and 
that right was violated because the deprivation of counsel was erroneous. 
No additional showing of prejudice is required to make the violation 
"complete." 
Id. at 146 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court went on to hold that, "We have little 
trouble concluding that erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, 'with 
consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably 
qualifies as structural error."' Id. at 150 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 
282 (1993)). 
As mentioned above, Mr. Ellis is arguing that he was denied the right to select 
counsel of his choice and that State has responded by arguing, in part, that the denial of 
the motion for a continuance was justified because there is no record of an attorney-
client conflict in this case. (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) Mr. Ellis argues that little weight 
should afforded to the lack of an attorney-client conflict in this matter because any 
inconvenience caused by an eighteen day continuance of the probation violation 
hearing pales in comparison to the denial of Mr. Ellis' right to counsel of his choice, as 
denial of that right constitutes structural error. 
In sum, there was no legitimate reason to deny Mr. Ellis' motion for a 
continuance to be represented by private counsel. In the Respondent's Brief, the State 
only highlights that one of the district court's rationales for denying the continuance was 
unconstitutional, as the district court punished Mr. Ellis for hiring private attorneys, 
which in doing their job, previously kept Mr. Ellis from going to prison. It is important to 
note that the right to counsel of one's choice is so fundamental to our constitutional 
2 Citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-685 (1984). 
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system it constitutes structural error when it is denied. As such, this case must be 
remanded for further proceedings and Mr. Ellis must be afforded the right to hire 
counsel of his choice. 
11. 
The District Court Denied Mr. Ellis Due Process When It Refused To Continue The 
Disposition Portion Of The Probation Revocation Hearing, Which Was Requested To 
Afford Mr. Ellis The Opportunity To Prepare A Defense And Call Witnesses To Testify 
On His Behalf 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellis argued that the district court denied him due 
process because he was never provided notice that the March 21, 2013, probation 
hearing was going to include the disposition portion of the probation violation 
proceedings. In response, the State argues that the only notice Mr. Ellis was due under 
the State and Federal Constitutions was notice of the nature of the alleged probation 
violations. The State also argues that even if he was not provided meaningful notice, 
the error was harmless because he made no showing that the outcome of the 
proceedings would have been different had he received meaningful notice. Mr. Ellis 
argues that whenever a hearing is held wherein his liberty interests are at jeopardy, due 
process mandates that he be apprised of the date of the hearing and the subject matter 
of that hearing. Mr. Ellis also argues that the State cites to the wrong prejudice 
standard, and in order to establish reversible error he only needs to demonstrate that he 
had potential witnesses who would testify on his behalf. 
The March 21, 2013, probation hearing was only noticed as an "admit/deny" 
hearing. (03/21/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.12-16.) After the guilt phase of the hearing was held, 
the district court asked Mr. Ellis' defense counsel if he was ready to proceed to the 
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disposition phase of the hearing. (03/21/13 Tr., p.15, L.19 - p.16, L.16.) Defense 
counsel said that the hearing was only noticed as an admit/deny hearing and that he not 
ready to proceed to disposition. (03/21/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.10-16.) Defense counsel then 
said he only needed about a week in order to present witnesses who would testify on 
Mr. Ellis' behalf. (03/21/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.10-16.) The district court than asked defense 
counsel to provide an offer of proof as to the witnesses' potential testimony. (03/21/13 
Tr., p.16, Ls.17-18.) After defense counsel provided the offer of proof, indicating that 
Mr. Ellis was remaining sober and that he was working a twelve-step program, the 
district court accepted the offer as the truth and proceeded to disposition without 
hearing testimony from Mr. Ellis' witnesses. (03/21/13 Tr., p.16, L.17 - p.18, L.19.) 
Mr. Ellis argued that his right to due process was denied when the district court 
failed to provide him with notice that the March 21, 2013, hearing was going to include 
the disposition portion of the probation revocation proceedings. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.11-17.) In response, the State argues that Mr. Ellis was only entitled to "written 
notice of the claimed [probation] violations." (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13 ( quoting 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)).) According to the State, the process 
due pursuant to Morrissey is written notice of the alleged probation violations, but that 
notice requirement does not extend to notice of the date and nature of probation 
violation proceedings. The State's position is entirely at odds with the most basic 
notions of due process. 
3 The holding in Morrissey, which dealt with a parolee, was extended to probationers in 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). 
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"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding 
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (emphasis added). Notice "must afford a 
reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance .... " Id. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals has interpreted the foregoing holding from Mullane as follows: 
In other words, meaningful notice consists of both substantive and 
temporal components. That is, the content of the notice must be such as 
to fairly advise the person of its subject matter and the issues to be 
addressed. Notice must be clear, definite, explicit and unambiguous. A 
notice is not clear unless its meaning can be apprehended without 
explanation or argument. In addition, notice must be provided at a time 
which allows the person to reasonably be prepared to address the issue. 
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 542, 546 (Ct. App. 2009). The State's position is at odds with 
the foregoing authority, because it ignores both the temporal and substantive 
components of notice. Again, the State argues that the notice requirements contained 
in Morrisey and Gagnon only entitled Mr. Ellis to "written notice of the claimed 
[probation] violations." (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13.) However, Mr. Ellis was denied 
both the temporal and the substantive components of notice because he was not told 
that the March 21, 2013, hearing was going to include the disposition phase of the 
probation violation proceedings. 
It is also important to note that in Mullane, supra, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the substantive and temporal components of notice are applicable to 
"any proceeding" where a party's substantive rights are adjudicated. Mullane 339 U.S. 
at 314. Accordingly, the basic notice protections afforded to probationers in Morrissey 
11 
and Gagnon include the right to know what will be issue during a probation revocation 
hearing and when that hearing will occur. Moreover, notice must be reasonably 
calculated to allow the probationer time to mount a meaningful defense. None of this 
occurred in this case because Mr. Ellis was only informed that the March 21, 2013, 
hearing was going to be an "admit/deny" hearing. (03/21/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.1-18.) The 
fact that the hearing was only scheduled for an admit/deny hearing heightens the due 
process violation because Mr. Ellis was affirmatively misled as to the substance of the 
March 21, 2013, hearing. 
The State also argues, in the alternative, that even if Mr. Ellis' due process rights 
were violated, the error was harmless because the district court was going to revoke his 
probation regardless of Mr. Ellis' witnesses' testimony. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) 
The State's argument fails because it is based on the wrong prejudice standard. Actual 
prejudice need not be established when dealing with the denial of adequate notice or a 
meaningful hearing in regard to probation violation revocation proceedings. As cited in 
the Appellant's Brief (Appellant's Brief, p.15), "In order to establish an actual deprivation 
of due process [in regard to either a parole or probation revocation proceeding] it [is] 
incumbent upon [the defendant] to make some showing that the witnesses' testimony 
would have been material and favorable to his evaluation." State v. Hanslovan, 116 
Idaho 266, 268 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added). Again, the State's argument fails 
because it cites to the wrong standard. Mr. Ellis need not establish that his probation 
would not have been revoked if his witnesses would have testified. Mr. Ellis only needs 
to establish that he had witnesses who would provide the district court with material and 
favorable testimony. In this case, Mr. Ellis made that showing. (03/21/13 Tr., p.16, L.2 -
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p.18, L.6.) However, the district court accepted that showing as the truth, then denied 
Mr. Ellis his motion for a continuance, effectively denying him the right to have 
witnesses testify on his behalf. (03/21 /13 Tr., p.18, Ls. 7-19.) 
As argued in the Appellant's Brief (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16), the district court's 
acceptance of trial counsel's summary of Mr. Ellis' witnesses' potential testimony does 
not comport with the due process protections mandated by Morrissey and Gagnon, 
because a probationer is required to provide a summary of their witnesses' potential 
testimony in order to establish prejudice on an appeal. It follows that using the 
probationer's offer of proof as a substitute for the witnesses' actual testimony means 
there is no actual right to call witnesses at a probation revocation proceeding because 
such a practice denies a probationer a remedy for a violation of that right to call 
witnesses. Moreover, the use of trial counsel's summary of Mr. Ellis' witnesses' 
potential testimony was a poor substitute for their actual testimony, as "[e]vidence ... 
has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces come together a 
narrative gains momentum, with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain 
the willingness of [the finder of fact] to draw the inferences, whatever they may be, 
necessary to reach an honest [conclusion]." Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 
187 (1997). 
In sum, the district court violated Mr. Ellis' due process rights when it failed to 
provide Mr. Ellis notice that the March 21, 2013, hearing was going to include the 
disposition portion of the probation violation proceedings. The State's position that he 
need not be provided notice of the date of that hearing or the subject matter to be 
addressed at that hearing is at odds with the most basic notions of due process. 
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Additionally, the State cited to a prejudice standard which does not control Mr. Ellis' 
claim of error. To establish reversible error, Mr. Ellis only needed to make a showing 
that he had potential witnesses who would testify favorably on his behalf, which he did. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ellis respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 18th day of August, 2014. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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